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Strategic Sisterhood
or Sisters In Solidarity?
Questions of Communitarianism and
Citizenship in Asia
AIHWA ONG*
The Fourth World Conference on Women (Beijing 1995) has spawned a
triumphant sense among Western/Northern feminists that they are forging a
strategic sisterhood with less privileged women in the South. Feminists from
metropolitan countries seek a new North-South alliance whereby they make
strategic interventions on behalf of third world women by putting pressure on
their governments. Professor Ong critiques strategic sisterhood on the
following grounds:
First, strategic sisterhood is based on individualistic notions of
transnational feminine citizenship, ignoring the historical and cultural
differences between women from the first and third worlds. In particular, the
concept ignores geopolitical inequalities whereby postcolonial countries are
sensitive to what they view as new forms of cultural imperialism. For many
Asian leaders and subjects, women's emancipation is seldom just a question
about individual rights, but fundamentally about culture, community, and the
nation.
Second, strategic sisterhood brushes aside other forms of morality--
whether expressed in nationalist ideology, or embedded in religious and
communal practices--that shape local notions and relations of gender,
hierarchy, loyalty, and social security. These webs ofpower relations are the
everyday contexts within which third world women must struggle for their
rights.
To illustrate both points, Professor Ong draws on cases from China,
Indonesia, and Malaysia, where popular struggles for human rights are
usually couched in terms of community--class, religion, or nation--not gender.
The silence regarding women's problems is especially striking in resurgent
labor movements where a significant proportion of workers are young women
working in abysmal conditions. Foreign feminists must first understand the
* Professor, Department of Anthropology, University of California at Berkeley.
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conditions shaped by communitarian ideologies--produced by ruling regimes,
labor, or religious elites--within which most third world women must negotiate
their rights and self-identity. Professor Ong presents the example of Muslim
feminists in Malaysia struggling for women's rights, not by forming strategic
partnerships with Western feminists (a strategy guaranteed to fail), but by
engaging local men in (re)defining gender rights within the framework of
Islamic morality, nation, and civilization. The struggles of these courageous
women deserve respect from Western feminists who are ever-ready to dismiss
any accommodations with Islam or non-Western moral ethos. After all,
feminism and women's rights only make sense in terms of the imagined
communities within which people live and, through their embeddedness in
local social relations and cultural norms, decide what is good and worthwhile
in their lives.
Globalization thus produces not a single international sisterhood
(dominated by Western feminist ideals and agents) but many possible,
negotiable, and partial collaborations between feminists in different countries.
Feminist sisterhoods are strategic when they can create a transnational public
that does not exclude the variety of alternative visions offemale citizenship
framed within alternative political moralities. Strategic sisterhood will be
most effective when it adheres to such a "weak" universal of female
emancipation.
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I. STRATEGIC SISTERHOOD?
The Fourth World Conference on Women held in China has ended, and
there is a sense of triumph among many feminists as they head for home.
There is pride that gender gaps in economic power, property rights, and
poverty have been put on the world's agenda, and the message, "macro-
development is a feminist issue" has been sounded loud and clear. Bina
Agarwal, an Indian economist, declares that:
Many Northern women today are finding common ground with
Southern women on economic issues, and wanting to be part of
commonly-defined strategies, including agitating against transnational
corporations.
This is not to argue that the North-South gap has disappeared. But
among women's groups there is growing recognition of the importance
of forging strategic links. One could say "romantic sisterhood" is
giving way to strategic sisterhood for confronting the global crisis of
economy and polity.'
Strategic sisterhood is a new transnational and transcultural strategy to
confront the entangled issues of globalization and women's rights.
Globalization, in the sense of the intensified capitalist integration of the world,
has spurred feminists to seek their own global strategy to fight for women's
rights bypassed or trampled in the rush to economic development. The term
strategic sisterhood implies a contingent North-South feminist partnership for
intervention in different countries where the gender gap is pervasive, but it also
suggests a transnational notion of citizenship for all women, regardless of their
economic, cultural, or national differences. Thus, Agarwal argues that the
energy coming from the Beijing Platform will help Indian feminists challenge
their government to put its "money and political backing where its words are."2
As citizens both of their own countries and of a transnational feminist public,
feminists can draw on their international alliances to hold their own
governments to account.
1. Bina Agarwal, Beijing Women's Conference: From Mexico '75 to Beijing '95, 49 MAINSTREAM
9, 10(1995).
2. Id.
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Yet a lacuna remains in this strategic sisterhood idea, one that is based on
democratic principles of citizenship, and that does not take into account the
varied cultural circumstances within which people live their lives. For decades
now, feminist nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), mainly through
meetings sponsored by the United Nations, have disseminated democratic
principles of citizenship to women throughout the world. Drawing on Kantian
democratic liberalism, their notions of citizenship are conceptualized in
absolute, universalistic terms of freedom and equality, regardless of
differences in historical and cultural experiences, not the least of which is
colonialism. While ideals of social equality for all human beings are difficult
to fault, we need to ask how these messages will be received in places that
have emerged from Western colonial domination and are just now forging their
own postcolonial identities and destiny. Thus mantras from the North like
"women's rights are human rights" may be received rather differently in
developing countries sensitive to any signs of the imposition of Western
cultural norms on the world. Northern feminists and many of their elite
Southern counterparts often skirt the issue of how to bring about
improvements in women's conditions without being seen as the new
imperialists. In order to do this, they must be more sensitive to imperialist
logic in their exchanges with women in postcolonial societies and become
aware that their perception of themselves as autonomous individuals depends
on their "liberation" of oppressed sisters in the third world.3
There are, for instance, two issues that strategic sisterhood needs to take
into account: nationalism and political moralities in postcolonial countries.
First, whereas in the Western/Northern-dominated discourses,4 women's rights
are based simply on the notion of individual autonomy, in postcolonial Asian
countries like India, women and the home represent "the original site on which
the hegemonic project of nationalism was launched."' Outsiders talking about
3. Aihwa Ong, Colonialism and Modernity: Feminist Re-presentations of Women in Non-Western
Societies, 3/4 INSCRIPTIONS (1988) ( I argued that First World feminists defined themselves in opposition
not to First World men, but to Third World women, who are viewed as their social inferiors. We cannot talk
about gender inequality in non-Western countries without situating our analyses in the context of cultural
imperialism and geopolitical ranking of nations in the world.)
4. In this essay, I will be using the terms "Western" and "Northern," on the one hand, and
"Southern" and "non-Western" interchangeably. They refer not so much to absolutely fixed geographical
relations as to the relations of political and economic inequalities in the world stemming from colonialism,
imperialism, uneven capitalist development, and contemporary market forces.
5. PARTHA CHATTERJEE, THE NATION AND ITS FRAGMENTS: COLONIAL AND POSTCOLONIAL
HISTORIES 147 (1993).
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women's rights are tampering with "the inner spaces of community," and thus
"the life of the nation."'6 Thus, for Asian leaders and their citizens, women's
emancipation is never just about individual rights, but fundamentally about
culture, community, and the nation.' These issues are especially potent at the
historical juncture when many postcolonial countries are finally emerging as
economic competitors to the West, and they are especially sensitive to having
a women's rights ideology imposed from the West.
Consider, for instance, the comments of two female leaders who represent
North-South perspectives from two vastly different points of departure. First
Lady Hillary Rodham Clinton, speaking as a representative of the confident
world power, declared at the Beijing Conference: "What we are learning
around the world is that, if women are healthy and educated, their families will
flourish. If women are free from violence, their families will flourish. If
women have a chance to work and earn as full and equal partners in society,
their families will flourish."8 In contrast, Mine. Huang Qizao, vice-president
of the All-China Women's Federation, said:
The founding of the People's Republic of China ended the thousands
of years of feudal oppression and enslavement of women and the
country's history of being trampled and bullied by foreign aggressors.
... [A]s you all know, China is a developing country. Barriers still
exist to achieving equality in women's participation in political
affairs, employment, education, and marriage. Therefore there is still
a long way to go on women's emancipation and development.9
Whereas Clinton sees the answer to women's emancipation in the freedom
of women, Huang considers the fight for women's emancipation within the
Chinese struggle with colonial domination. Clinton focuses on individual
rights, Huang on the the right to self-determination for the country. However,
6. Id.
7. Talking about struggles over gender meaning in Malaysia, I argued, "The twists and turns in
gender contestations show vividly that gender politics are seldom merely about gender; they represent and
crystallize nationwide struggles over a crisis of cultural identity, development class formation, and the
changing kind of imagined community that are envisioned." ONG, supra note 3, at 86.
8. First Lady Hillary Rodham Clinton, Remarks for the United Nations Fourth World Conference
on Women, held in Beijing, China (Sept. 5, 1995).
9. Speech made by Mine. Huang Qizao, Vice Chairperson of the COC and Vice President of the All-
China Women's Federation on the Press Meeting, The China NGO Forum Committee of COC, NGO
Internet News.
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the North-South tensions go beyond different starting points that view
women's problems in terms of individual rights or in terms of the nation. The
contemporary geopolitical distribution of power enables Clinton to position
herself as speaking for women all over the world, while Huang confines
herself to speaking only for women in her own country, a strategy that
implicitly rejects the right of Northerners to dictate universal prescriptions. As
speaker for an emerging global power, Huang is asserting her country's claim
to deal with their women's question in their own way, within other national
agendas of development and collective security. This conflict over strategies--
whether gender inequality is best fought at the global level, or must be
struggled for within the particular historical, cultural and political
circumstances of each country--is something that strategic sisterhood glosses
over.
Feminist NGOs appear to have two major strategies regarding women's
rights. One is to formulate norms of gender equality that are universally
applicable; the other is to put pressures on particular governments to protect
women's interests and rights within their own borders." Much of the approach
is narrowly legalistic, and the focus has been on macro-level interventions.
Insufficient attention has been paid to cultural differences and sensibilities
which are critical for any reform to work without coercion in our complex
multinational world. We need anthropologists as much as lawyers to do the
work of understanding and promoting women's rights. Anthropologists and
feminists have been very sensitive to Western tendencies of "othering"
whereby we obtain our sense of being liberated late twentieth century subjects
from defining others, especially women from the Third World, as backward
and oppressed traditional subjects. 1 We are acutely aware of the need to
understand gender problems within the context of competing problems in
developing countries, and to be mindful of global inequalities between cultures
and nations that cause Third World societies to be sensitive to metropolitan
reform and intervention.
10. See CHARLOTTE BUNCH & NAMH RILLY, DEMANDING ACCOUNTABILITY: THE GLOBAL
CAMPAIGN AND VIENNA TRIBUNAL FOR WOMEN'S HUMAN RIGHTS (1994) (broad conceptualizations of
women's human rights); see generally THE FOURTH WORLD CONFERENCE ON WOMEN: ACTION FOR
EQUALITY, DEVELOPMENT, AND PEACE, THE BEIJING DECLARATION AND PLATFORM FOR ACTION, (Sept. 15,
1995) (demonstrating proposals for NGOs to work closely with governments and to monitor policies and
programs already in place).
11. Ong, supra note 3, at 85.
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Western feminists, whether academic or activitist, are often seen as
working in collaboration with the imperialist hegemonies of Northern
countries. For instance, Northern feminists at the Beijing Conference
represented themselves as enlightened and liberated subjects with the answers
to the problems of women in non-Western cultures. When delegations from
Catholic and Muslim countries sought to define "separate but equal" identities
for women that would assure their rights while preserving distinctive male and
female social roles, they were dubbed "traditional" and marginalized by liberal
feminists who dominated the NGO meetings. A more fruitful stance would
have yielded truly transnational exchanges whereby both sides learned more
about the details of each other's societies and the ways women's agencies are
engendered and shaped in particular webs of power.
A second issue that strategic sisterhood needs to recognize, beyond the
tensions between the "civilizing" logic of Western feminists and the
postcolonial resistances of feminists from the Third World, is the basic
differences in notions about political morality, a term that has been defined as
"a set of moral arguments about the justification of political action and
political institutions."' 2 For Northern feminists, women's rights have their
basis in Western liberal ideals of moral independence, the individual right and
capacity to make moral judgments about the value of goals and projects that
constitute the good life. Ronald Dworkin argues that liberal political theory,
from which Western feminism is derived, operates from an "abstracted
egalitarian plateau" according to which "the interests of the members of a
community matter, and matter equally." 3 This fundamental egalitarianism
requires that the government treat all individuals as equals, in order to ensure
conditions for each individual to make moral decisions about their goals in
life, as well as to have the right to change them. Liberal feminism, as
expressed in international forums, is fundamentally about women's rights as
individual rights with men in their society and in the global economy.
Although this is a basic twentieth century ideal, North-South conflict erupts
when liberal feminists disregard alternative political moralities that shape the
ways women in other societies make moral judgments about their interests and
goals in life, and use other cultural criteria about what it means to be female
and human.
12. Will Kymlicka, Liberalism and Communilarianism, 18 CAN. J. PHIL. 181 (1988).
13. Id. at 184 (citing Ronald Dworkin, In Defense of Equality, 1 SOC. PHIL. AND POL'Y 24).
19961
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As feminists seek to form sisterly links and collaborations around the
world, we should pause often and ask ourselves, "Whose 'imagined
communities' are we dealing with?"14 When we think about globalization, and
the pressing problems affecting women and children globally, we are tempted
to brush aside other social imaginaries that do not view women's rights in
quite the same way.15 It will be important to attend to how discourses of
community, development, and gender are negotiated in a particular society.
Such ideological discourses are "an exercise in symbolic power,"' 6 whether at
the national or transnational level; they set the terms in which debates about
citizenship and society proceed.
In Asian countries, colonial and postcolonial struggles have been based on
national ideologies of community, and any discussion of the women's issue is
always framed in terms of collective interests. These narratives construct
different levels of control, regulation, and power that position women as well
as shape their agency. We need to understand, for example, how a national
discourse of community is able to negotiate with subaltern ones "on its own
terms for the purposes of producing consent."'7 Below, I discuss the moral
philosophies of some Asian elites, who maintain that political morality as it
governs citizenship is determined by the State. Then I consider how workers'
movements in Asia have reacted to the disruptive effects of globalization,
especially the plight of millions of workers, the majority of whom are female.
In both sets of narratives, political morality is couched in terms of relations
between citizens and the State, and there is a complicity of silence about the
special circumstances of female exploitation, many engendered by local
responses to globalization. Specifically, I ask, why are certain issues of
women articulated or not articulated in discourses of community when female
labor plays a growing and critical role in programs of national development?
I end by discussing how Muslitn feminists in Malaysia, a rapidly
industrializing country, are able to negotiate a space for articulating women's
rights within the discourse of Islam. Sisters-in-Islam represents the kind of
14. The term "imagined communities" was coined by Benedict Anderson to describe social
imaginaries of belonging associated with the birth of nations. BENEDICT ANDERSON, IMAGINED
COMMUNITIES: REFLECTIONS ON THE ORIGIN AND SPREAD OF NATIONALISM 147 (1983).
15. See Arjun Appadurai, Disjuncture and Difference in the Global Cultural Economy, 2 PUB.
CULTURE 2, 5 (1990) (defining social imaginaries as the "constructed landscapes of collective aspirations
•.. now mediated through the complex prism of modem media.").
16. Stuart Hall, The Toad in the Garden: Thatcherism Among Theorists, in MARXISM AND THE
STUART HALL INTERPRETATION OF CULTURE (Cary Nelson & Lawrence Grossberg, eds., 1988).
17. CHATTERJEE, supra note 5, at 13.
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genuine, homegrown feminism of which strategic sisterhood should be more
supportive.
II. THE MORAL ECONOMY OF THE STATE
"If racism is the unspoken of nation, then sexism, or sexual inequality
if you will, is the unspoken of transnationalism."''8
A major result of globalization is that Asian countries are experiencing
some of the highest rates of economic growth in the world. Rapid
industrialization has created huge laboring populations, migrant flows, urban
congestion, and class differentiation-all conditions that contribute to anxieties,
social upheavals, and political unrest that can undo the very gains of
development. It is perhaps not surprising that under such disruptive
circumstances, governing regimes have increasingly relied upon discourses of
community as structuring hegemonies to shape people's sense of identity,
belonging, and citizenship.
In countries referred to as the "mini dragons," such as Singapore, and other
rapidly industrializing "dragons," such as Malaysia and China, the role of the
State as a producer of moral meanings has intensified as development picks up
speed. Every so often, leaders from these countries attend to the ritual task of
claiming the distinctiveness of Asian economies and cultures. 9 While most
Western observers view these pronouncements about "the Asian way" as a
critique of Western cultures, these visions of community must also be
understood as ideological forces for disciplining society as it undergoes rapid
economic development." These Asian narratives continually (re)construct and
(re)define cultural values as the duty of citizens to discipline themselves and
increase labor productivity in order to fulfill social obligations for the good of
society as a whole.
18. Hall, supra note 16, at 67.
19. There are different perspectives on these narratives of Asian cultural exceptionalism, but they
are all linked to the emerging capitalist power of the nations concerned. See Aihwa Ong, Chinese
Modernities: Narratives of Nation and Capitalism in the Asia/Pacific, in UNGROUNDED EMPIRES: THE
CULTURAL POLITICS OF MODERN CHINESE TRANSNATIONALISM, (Aihwa Ong and Don Nonini, eds., 1996);
Mark T. Berger, Yellow Mythologies: The East Asian Miracle and Post-Cold War Capitalism, 4 POSITIONS
90 (1996); C.J. W-L. Wee, Framing the 'New' East Asia: Anti-Imperialist Discourse and Global
Capitalism, in CULTURE AND COMMUNICATION IN AStA (David Birch, ed., forthcoming).
20. See ONG, supra note 19; see also WEE, supra note 19.
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In these narratives, issues of human rights, and implicitly, women's rights,
are constructed as social rights contingent on the political and social needs of
development. Development is a top priority in State-strengthening projects as
globalization makes it possible for many Asian countries to "catch up" with
the West. Thus, in a variety of international forums, Asian leaders have recast
the human rights debate by declaring that the right of the nation to develop is
also a human right. At the 1993 World Conference on Human Rights held in
Vienna, ti e Chinese Vice-Foreign Minister Liu Huaqiu emphasized that for
developing zountries, the paramount importance of economic and social rights
sets limits on individual rights:
The rights and obligations of a citizen are indivisible. While enjoying
his legitimate rights and freedom, a citizen must fulfill his social
responsibilities and obligations. There are no absolute individual
rights and freedom .... Nobody shall place his own rights interests
[sic] above those of the state and society, nor should he be allowed to
impair those of others and the general public.21
Such expressions are an instance of what I call "the moral economy of the
State" in Asia, whereby the developmentalist State is ideologically presented
as the authoritative regulator of social exchanges between State and citizens.
James C. Scott applies the "moral economy" idea' to Southeast Asian peasant
society wherein unequal exchanges between patrons and peasants are morally
justified. Scott claims that the agrarian moral order accepted social inequality
because patrons provided crucial social and material guarantees to peasants in
return for their labor, services, and loyalty. In a moral economy system, the
subordinated groups perceive the unequal exchanges as collaborative and
morally legitimate because they ensure security for all.
Here, I readapt Scott's moral economy idea to describe the critical
importance of a State-produced ideology that embeds notions of State-citizen
relations within a moral economy ethos. I differ from Scott in that I believe
21. Liu Huaqiu, Proposals for Human Rights Protection and Promotion, BELING REV. Jun.28-July
4, 1993, at 9. For a full-fledged official statement on (the limits of) human rights in China, see The
Progress of Human Rights in China, CHINA DAILY, Dec. 20, 1995, at 13-16.
22. JAMES C. SCOTT, THE MORAL ECONOMY OF THE PEASANT (1976). Scott was inspired by the
"moral economy" concept first introduced by British historian Edward P. Thompson who analyzed 18th
century food riots by English artisans and others displaced by new industries as protests against the loss of
premodern social controls over market forces. See Edward P. Thompson, The Moral Economy of the
English Crowd in the Eighteenth Century, 50 PAST AND PRESENT 76, 1971.
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that the dominant party, in this case the State, must continually produce the
cultural values to engender and sustain adherence to a moral economy
ideology.' Moral codes do not merely emerge from preexisting cultural norms
but must be invented and reinvented by the ruling elites, both in the ritual
pronouncements about Asian cultural values, and in policy mechanisms that
reinforce expected citizens' compliance and workers' productivity. In
countries like Singapore, Malaysia, and China, citizens are persuaded that their
governments will guarantee economic and social well-being in return for
economic discipline and social conformity. Elite narratives construct a balance
of rights/freedoms and obligations/duties whereby the State ensures conditions
for economic accumulation in return for tolerable constraints and selective
repression of citizens' rights.
The moral economy of the Asian State is often defined in opposition to
Western liberal democracy, especially the Western liberal promotion of free
speech and political opposition to the regime in power. In many cases, the
moral economy is presumed to reside in the Confucian values attributed to
ethnic Chinese subjects. In spelling out the features of Asian modernity, Asian
elites are also reinforcing the localization of citizen-subjects.24 For instance,
Lee Kuan Yew, the former Prime Minister of Singapore, asks rhetorically, "Do
we need the kind of free-for-all libertarianism that we see in America?"
Singaporeans, he claims, do not want a loosening of the reins in their tight
little republic: "[T]he majority of Chinese-Singaporeans do not want to be
actively involved in political parties. It's not in their culture. What they want
is to have somebody governing them well and producing things that they
want."25
The Singaporean regime has raised to a fine art the interweaving of private
sentiments with public interests. Another official declares that Singapore
represents the virtues of a small democracy that is buttressed by extended
family networks. "No democracy can function well without strong moral
23. Scott assumes that moral economy concepts emerge from the precarious circumstances of peasant
livelihood which foster social values of reciprocity and exchanges that can help avert disaster for individual
households and the community as a whole. I do not contest this view of peasant society; however, in my
formulation of the moral economy of the modem Southeast Asian state, I argue that the ideology of morally
justified exchanges must be continually produced and organized by the state, regardless of whether there
is a pre-existing set of moral values that will support such unequal collaborations between citizens and the
state.
24. ONG, supra note 19.
25. Henry Kamm, In Prosperous Singapore, Even the Elite are Nervous About Speaking Out, N. Y.
TIMES, Aug. 13, 1995, at 1, 10.
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underpinnings supported by the entire community ... . In Singapore, we
deliberately work our welfare policies through the family. The objective is to
strengthen the family net, not weaken it."26  This communitarian ethos,
whereby the communal values of the family are constructed as consonant with
those of the State, can also be found in Taiwan, which has in recent years.
enjoyed a flowering of democratic liberalization.'
Taiwan is a booming country with huge foreign reserves accumulated
during decades of industrialization through sub-contracting arrangements with
global corporations. The glamour of the economic miracle conceals the fact
that the majority of workers are underpaid or unpaid married women working
in thousands of small "living-room" factories. 8 The State and major
corporations are thus relieved of the actual work of disciplining labor, and a
government handbook on labor attributes Taiwan's economic progress to
"harmonious" labor-capitalist relations shaped by Chinese values. 9 The
handbook spells out a communitarian vision that differentiates between
relative and absolute obligations:
The relative obligation means that one need not fulfill his obligation
if the other party fails to realize his. The absolute obligation means
that one is not exempt from his obligation even when the other party
fails his/hers. In other words, no matter how rude or harsh the other
becomes, based on the moral standards applicable to all human beings,
you should still carry out whatever obligations you are supposed to
carry out. The absolute obligation between the workers and capitalists
is the essence of what we call the moral norms between the workers
and the capitalists.3
As spelled out, the workplace moral code does not distinguish between the
genders, but as the majority of the factories are based on male-headed family
units, one can only assume that it endorses the paternalism of these enterprises
and the absolute obligations between family members. An ethnographic
26. George Yeo, In Asia and Elsewhere, Smaller Will Be the Better Way to Govern, INT'L HERALD
TRIB., June 22, 1994, at 4, available in 1994 WL 9789931.
27. Thomas Gold, Factors in Taiwan's Democratic Consolidation, Address at the Center for Chinese
Studies, U.C. Berkeley, (Jan. 26, 1996).
28. PING-CHUN HS1UNG, LIVING ROOMS AS FACTORIES: CLASS, GENDER, AND THE SATELLITE
FACTORY SYSTEM IN TAIwAN (1995).
29. Id. at 59.
30. Id. at 60.
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investigation of these factories discovers that female labor is often recast as
"helping out" relatives in return for "favors," whereas the demands of the male
boss are perceived as his rightful claiming of personal debts." In the
Singaporean and Taiwanese elite-produced imaginaries, (Chinese) family
relations are invoked as the model of binding obligations between citizens and
the State on the one hand, and workers and capital on the other. Implicit in
these narratives are women as the unmarked category, represented by terms
like "family" and "worker" whose compliance with these "cultural norms" is
critical to the social stability and economic success that are desired by the
entire society.
In Asian countries not dominated by Chinese populations, the
communitarian theme is cast in broader terms of Asian cultural
exceptionalism, most spectacularly represented by Japan. The Malaysian
prime minister Mahathir Mohamad has joined forces with Shinjaro Ishihara,
author of The Japan that Can Say No, in a new book called The Voice ofAsia:
Two Leaders Discuss the Coming Century." In a recent interview, Mohamad
notes that Asian countries have mastered the industrial skills of the West and
yet retained "much of their own distinctive traditions" which will be the source
of Asian independence from future domination.3  That autonomy, in
Mohamad's view, is guaranteed by "the not-so-liberal" State, because Asians
believe "strong, stable governments . . . are a prerequisite for economic
development." He argues that "when citizens understand that their right to
choose also involves limits and responsibilities, democracy doesn't deteriorate
into an excess of freedom... .""
Criticizing the "hedonistic values" he associates with liberal individualism,
Mohamad argues that what appears to the West as an undeveloped sense of
self in Asia is the source of their adaptation to modern production systems.35
In other words, Asian "communitarian capitalism" is opposed to the
individualistic capitalism of "the West," which in these othering narratives is
3 1. See generally id
32. MAHATHIR BIN MOHAMAD & SHINTARO ISHIHARA, THE VOICE OF ASIA: Two LEADERS Discuss
THE COMING CENTURY, (Frank Baldwin trans., 1995). The Japanese version of the book has a more
combative title: THE ASIA THAT CAN SAY No: A POLICY TO COMBAT EUROPE AND AMERICA.
33. The following discussion of Mohamad's views was taken from excerpts that were reprinted in
A Challenge from Two Asian Statesmen: Will East Beat West?, WORLD PRESS REv. Dec. 1995, at 6, 8.
(Containing excerpts from MAHATmiR MOHAMAD & SHiNTARO ISHiHARA, THE VOICE OF ASIA: Two
LEADERS DISCUSS THE COMING CENTURY).
34. Id. at 8 nd 11.
35. Id at 10.
1996]
GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES JOURNAL
often taken as a homogenized whole, represented by the United States. 36
Mohamad points out that, like Japan, Malaysia in the 1970s established
"Malaysia Inc.," or a government-capital alliance that requires the yoking of
the public and private sectors in a way that prospers from "collaboration rather
than confrontation with officialdom."" Mohamad claims that this mix of
limited democracy and communitarian capitalism has been the foundation of
the extraordinary growth in Asia, especially in Malaysia, Singapore, and
Indonesia. These new "mini dragons" have inspired China and Vietnam to
adopt a mix of strong State controls and flexible market production.38
By attributing the economic success of Asian countries to values of
communitarianism, Asian regimes set the terms in which debates about
citizenship and women's rights should proceed. As exercises "of symbolic
power,"39 such ideological discourses instill discipline in the population while
engendering legitimation and loyalty in the name of Asian moral values.
Although these narratives arise from different locales, together they form a
transnational public whereby disruptions and conflicts, caused by rapid
economic development and social upheavals, are managed by the continual
invention and reinvention of a public morality based on asymmetrical
obligations and paternal authority. In its most extreme form, the combination
of "state-fathering" and a "phallic Confucianism" ideologically ties the
communitarian worker, the extended family, and the strong State together in
an integrated frame of State "biopolitics," or the processes of management and
control of the population that makes it "govemable."'"
36. See Lester Thurow, Communitarian vs. Individualistic Capitalism, NEW PERSPECTIVES Q., 41,
41-44 (Winter 1992). Lester Thurow maintains that Germany and Japan share many features, such as
corporate-state alliances that make their form of capitalism more "communitarian" than that found in the
United States.
37. A Challenge from Two Asian Statesmen: Will East Beat West, supra note 33, at 11.
38. Indeed, in Asia, economic restructuring has been inseparable from the rise of strong states. For
instance, Herb Feith argues that since the 1960s, throughout the Asia Pacific region, new "repressive-
developmentalist regimes" have arisen in conjunction with state direction of export-oriented
industrialization, the disciplining of the new workers, and the maintenance of the new technical,
professional, and bureaucratic elites that manage state apparatuses and interface with transnational
corporations. Herb Feith, Repressive-Developmentalist Regimes in Asia, 7 ALTERNATIVES 491 (1982). The
close alliances between state and capital that characterize these "bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes" has
charted the path to economic boom from South Korea, through Taiwan, Singapore, and Hong Kong, the so-
called Asian tigers or "mini dragons." Id.
39. Hall, supra note 16, at 58.
40. Geraldine Heng & Janadas Devan, State Fatherhood: The Politics of Nationalism, Sexuality, and
Race in Singapore, in BEWITCHING WOMEN, PIOUS MEN: GENDER AND BODY POLITICS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
195 (Aihwa Ong & Michael G. Peletz eds., 1995).
41. Michel Foucault, Governmentality, in THE FOUCAULT EFFECT: STUDIES IN GOVERNMENTALITY
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In order to support women's rights in these Asian countries, Western
feminists must penetrate these layers of communitarian ideologies if they hope
to understand the different dynamics, ideological construction, and handling
of social conflicts. Common to all these discourses about the nation,
community, family, and collective security is the unspoken assumption of
sexual inequality. Masculine power is the feature that provides the connection
across nations and nation-states and is the hidden/covert symbolic power--a
regime of truth cast in the language of family, community, and nation--that
localizes and fixes female subjects in succeeding webs of power relations.
Thus, narratives of Chinese fraternities and networks, worker-capitalist
obligations, and State-family moral orders are ideological buttresses against
citizens' restlessness and workers' disruptions that may threaten the
developmentalist state.
The complicities of women in these visions must be traced to their
dependence on the moral economies of the family, community, and the nation
which demand, in successive layers of claims, their duties and loyalty in return
for social security and cultural belonging. These familialistic regimes are a
form of "symbolic violence," a term sociologist Pierre Bourdieu uses to mean
the unconscious practices of intimidation euphemized both by those who
dominate and those who are dominated. 2 Thus, while female workers in
wealth-making enterprises may resist coercion, after an everyday fashion, by
paternalism at home or in workplaces, they are already disciplined to be
communitarian workers by the moral codes that construct their services as
absolute obligations to the family, the community, and the nation.
Workers at the front lines of production do not, of course, necessarily
share these views of absolute claims on their labor. A report by the U.S.-based
Human Rights Watch/Asia observes that: "[T]he Asian concept of human
rights, stressing economic development over political rights and collective
duties over individual freedoms, is largely a self-serving construct of Asian
governments that has been widely rejected by Asian human rights activists."43
We shall see, however, that in the new Asian workers' movements,
complicities with ruling ideas about community and masculine privilege
minimize the recognition of gender exploitation.
87 (Graham Burchell et a]. eds., 1991).
42. PIERRE BOUIDIEU, OUTLINE OFA THEORY OF PRACTICE (Richard Nice trans., 1977) (1972).
43. Rights Records of Swnmit Nations Denounced, WASH. POST, Nov. 14, 1994, at A18.
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Ill. ASIAN LABOR MOVEMENTS, FIGHTING BACK, OVERLOOK WOMEN'S
RIGHTS
One glaring paradox of globalization is that flexible systems of finance,
production, and distribution, by their ability to take advantage of different
market niches and to exploit "time-space compression," 44 leave out masses of
people who have little hope of gaining access to jobs. This extraordinary
power of evanescence, omission, and exclusion operates as a time-space
disciplinary technology that tempers labor struggles against the runaway
factories. 5 There is a sense, especially for people from developing countries,
that it is better to be "exploited" by transnational corporations than to be left
out in the dustbowls of underdevelopment. Much of the South has fallen
outside the new economic zones created by globalization, without access to the
structures that will gain it mimimally-paid jobs and the ability to buy consumer
goods.
In recent years, the rise of independent labor movements in Asia has not
directly challenged foreign capital or industrialization as such, but merely
focused on the abysmal working conditions and low wages, circumstances
against which they seek protection and guarantees from the State. Rapid
industrialization in China and Indonesia has given rise to independent unions
fighting appalling labor abuses and poor wages, spawning an ever increasing
series of strikes and labor action that has challenged political control. Sidney
Jones, the former executive director of Human Rights Watch, comments: "The
labor movement is becoming the major human rights movement all across East
Asia. Economic development is the source of legitimacy for many of these
governments. The labor movement forces the issue of who benefits from that
development."'
In much of modem history, workers' movements have also been an
important site of struggle for women's rights, even if female workers seldom
achieve equal standing with male workers.47 Since women form a significant,
44. DAVID HARVEY, THE CONDITION OFPOSTMODERNITY 284-387 (1989).
45. See AIHwA ONG, SPIRITS OF RESISTANCE AND CAPITALIST DISCIPLINE: FACTORY WOMEN IN
MALAYSIA (1987); see also DIANE L. WOLF, FACTORY DAUGHTERS: GENDER, HOUSEHOLD DYNAMICS, AND
RURAL INDUSTRIALIZATION IN JAVA (1992).
46. Merrill Goozner & Uli Schmetzer, Asian Workers Fighting Back: Low Wages, Terrible Working
Conditions Foster Strikes, CHIC. TRIB., Nov. 7, 1994, at I and 6.
47. There is a growing literature on female workers' struggles-both formal and informal-for
equality in the modem global factory. In third world contexts affected by globalization, women's resistances
have been primarily informal, ad hoc, and underground. Besides the works already cited, see generally
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if not overwhelming, majority in many of the new Asian manufacturing
industries, I will explore the terms of negotiations between the States and their
workers, to discover whether women's rights are presented in the imaginaries
of these male-led movements.
IV. INDONESIA: LABOR PROTESTS WITHIN NATIONAL IDEOLOGY
Indonesia is the largest Muslim country in the world, with a population of
180 million. It is a teeming archipelago that has been transformed in recent
years into an industrializing power with -a nearly seven-million-strong
industrial labor force, growing at the rate of two million per year .4 In many
cases, ethnic Chinese or Koreans operate factories subcontracted with
transnational corporations to produce garments, shoes, toys, watches, and other
consumer goods for the world markets. Although Indonesian workers are
among the lowest paid in Asia, factory operators seek to further lower wages
by paying less than legal minimum wages to a largely young female labor
force, or by employing children.49 These appalling conditions have given rise
to some of the largest labor protests in Indonesia's modern history. On the eve
of the Asia-Pacific Economic Council (APEC) Summit Meeting held in
November 1994, Amnesty International wrote a long report blaming the
Indonesian government for "human rights violations on a staggering scale.'""
Although most of the violations were focused on counterinsurgency operations
and political repression, there are growing violations of workers' rights. The
Indonesian government has crushed independent unions and imprisoned labor
activists, including the leaders of the largest nationwide independent union, the
Indonesia Welfare Labor Union (SBSI). President Suharto responded to the
international outcry by admitting that certain "excesses" might have occurred
as part of the development process and they must be remedied, but Indonesia
could not blindly follow Western human rights "that do not conform to our
national ideology."'"
Aihwa Ong, The Gender and Labor Politics of Postmodernity, in 20 ANN. REV. OF ANTHROPOLOGY 279
(1991) (providing a review of the literature).
48. Goozner & Schmetzer, supra note 46, at 6.
49. Id.
50. William Branigin, Activists Calling for Discussion of Hnuan Rights in Indonesia, FORT WORTH
STAR-TELEGRAM, Nov. 5, 1994, at 6AA.
51. Id
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The ideology of suppressing independent labor movements in the interest
of development was challenged by female workers like Masinah. In 1993,
Masinah, a young worker at a watch factory in Surabaya, was abducted, gang-
raped, and murdered for leading a strike to demand that a meal allowance of
U.S. $.25 be added to the U.S. $.84 daily wage. Her age and work conditions
were probably typical of the thousands upon thousands of young women
working in sweatshops throughout the archipelago. For instance, in an
industrial zone outside Jakarta, women work twelve hour days sewing GAP
outfits, making less than $2 a day, including overtime. Thousands of young
women are employed by Adidas and Nike, whose shoes cost $100-$150 a pair,
but the workers take home only $1.39 a day (or are paid thirty or forty cents
per pair)." The average worker needs at least $2.50 per day to pay for rent,
food, and transport.5
3
Managers punish the tardy by making them stand under the sun for hours,
and are quick to fire those who demand basic survival wages. 4 Sexual
harassment includes timing visits to the toilet, and using the excuse of
checking menstrual leaves (which provide time off from work) to conduct
bodily searches. Workers are cramped into dormitories above or next to
warehouses, thus creating firetraps. Such conditions are similar in other
industrial zones like the one in Medan, Sumatra, where food-producing
factories are charged with employing "workers barely in their teens."5 It is
telling that although child labor advocates in Indonesia have protested the
employment of children, there is no public articulation of gender exploitation.
Instead of focusing on the age or gender of the majority of workers, the
independent union SBSI has led successful nationwide strikes over the
violation of the minimum wage law. The critical dimensions of exploitasi
[exploitation] are viewed primarily in ethnic or communal terms. For instance,
labor activitists have cast their struggles in terms of ethnic exploitation,
distributing leaflets urging workers to "annihilate the Chinese" managers of
factories. Muslim clerics have expressed their support for SBSI, though it is
not recognized by the government as part of their wider protest against labor
repression.
52. Charles P. Wallace, Relief Elusive for Asia's Labor Pains, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 13, 1994, at H6.
53. Merrill Goozner, Western Firms Exploit Brutal Working Conditions in Asia, BUFFALO NEWS,
Nov. 20, 1994, at F8.
54. Id.
55. Goozner & Schmetzer, supra note 46, at 6.
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But has Masinah, as a symbol of factory women's courage, died in vain?
Masinah's murder provoked a national outcry, leading to some arrests. There
is widespread belief that the military was involved. A labor activist notes that
whenever there is a strike, the army is deployed against workers, no matter
how peaceful they are.56 Perhaps the fight for human survival overrides
consideration of gender difference in the treatment of workers. Indeed, the
negotiations between jailed SBSI leaders and the government seek a State
guarantee of a minimal level of income to ensure workers' survival. Although
the majority of the workers in these free trade zone enterprises are female,
gender issues are not raised in what appears to be a growing cross-class, cross-
ethnic conflict.
The overwhelming silence regarding women's exploitation among labor
activists perhaps reflects a desire to focus on the larger plight of all industrial
workers in the country, and also embarrassment over the ways local women
are treated in the country's race toward development. The decision to
articulate workers' grievances in cultural terms of obligations between workers
and their bosses, and to avoid references to gender exploitation, may also
reflect attempts to shield the dignity of female workers. There is also the
pervasive perception that female workers' earnings are supplementary to
family income," and perhaps young female workers do not merit special
attention in the labor movement. In spite of her gang rape and murder,
Masinah is hailed by labor activists as a symbol of class struggle, not of the
special predicaments of female workers. But the female character of this
cheapest form of factory labor is absolutely central to their exploitation as
cheap labor, as many ethnographical accounts have shown.5" Indeed, like
Masinah, female laborers are left to their own devices, often displaying a fierce
agency in quietly resisting everyday exploitation. Even the little information
we can glean from the occasional newspaper reports indicates that much of the
daily control of female workers centers on their bodies (the provision of food,
menstrual leave, family planning, and physical confinement). Sylvia Tiwon
has argued that the Javanese working woman's "articulation" is often not in
speech, but in the body. Their resistances must be read in bodily gestures like
averted eyes, silences, taking unauthorized menstrual leaves, and so on.59
56. Wallace, supra note 52.
57. WOLF, supra note 45.
58. See generally id.; ONG, supra note 45.
59. Sylvia Tiwon, Articulating the Body (1995) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the author).
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These silent actions deflect and weaken the effectiveness of techniques used
to discipline the female body. Women's mute bodily resistances can become,
in extreme cases, the means of what Gayatri Spivak calls "strategic
essentialism"' to protest labor exploitation, but unions have yet to use
women's difference in their struggles to secure human rights from their own
governments.
It is, of course, important to remind Western feminists that when one looks
closely at female employment in Third World industries, the abuses female
workers suffer cannot be traced simply to local patriarchal norms, but they are
elaborated upon and given new saliency when integrated with capitalist
mechanisms of labor control. These techniques are often introduced through
third-party nationals like South Koreans, Japanese, and yes, Americans.
Strategic sisterhoods will have to confront not only cultural practices in Third
World countries, but also metropolitan capitalist enterprises that are driven by
profits to seek cheap female labor in the South.
V. CHINA: COLLECTIVE SECURITY FOR WORKERS?
What about China, which boasts of the existence of an All-China
Women's Federation in its socialist government since 1949? in recent years,
industrial strikes, labor unrest, and accidents have occured among coal-miners,
farmers, and workers laid off by State-owned enterprises. New joint venture
factories that produce billions of dollars worth of toys, clothing, and electronic
goods in the booming coastal cities are not exempt from industrial accidents
or worker discontent.
During my November 1993 visit to Shenzhen in south China, a fire killed
eighty-four female workers in a toy factory. They were prevented from
escaping by doors and windows barred to prevent stealing. A month later,
sixty-one textile workers were killed in another factory blaze set by a
dismissed worker in Fuzhou, up the coast.6 I turned on the television and read
the local papers to discover local reactions to the tragedies. There was a lot of
talk about not blaming the foreign factory owners for fear of discouraging
foreign investments, and some blaming of corrupt factory inspectors for not
60. Gayatri C. Spivak, Can the Subaltern Speak? in MARXISM AND THE INTERPRETATION OF
CULTURE 271 (Cary Nelson & Lawrence Grossberg eds., 1988).
61. Marcus W. Brauchli & Joseph Kahn, Labor's Pains: China's Workers Encounter Hardship on
Capitalist Road, ASIAN WALL ST. J., May 20-21, 1994, at 1, 5.
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enforcing rules against barred windows and overcrowding in storage areas.
Hardly any mention was made of the female workers who died; in any case,
many were migrants from poorer provinces and their identities were snuffed
out along with their lives.
In the aftermath of the fire, Guangdong province, home to thousands of
sweatshop factories, drafted a new law that would ban locating workshops,
dormitories, and storage areas together, the so-called "three-in-one" factories
common throughout the Pearl River delta industrial zone. On paper were laws
that mandate a five and one-half day work week and ban child labor and forced
overtime; foreign-backed joint ventures are also required to have labor
unions.6" Leaders of the workers' movement are skeptical whether the rules
will ever be enforced, since their violations are a feature of everyday life in the
joint ventures.63 It was only a year later, as the Chinese government geared up
for the United Nations Conference on Women, that a special State-sponsored
investigation was conducted on the plight of female workers in the Shanghai
special economic zone. It discovered forced overtime, up to 137 hours a
month,' and widespread discrimination against married and pregnant women.
The investigative team called for tougher license requirements to protect
female workers, and for accelerating union formation.6" Labor leaders consider
these State expressions of concern about female workers as window dressing
to impress foreign observers gathered at the Beijing women's conference.
Indeed, a young woman in a Guangdong factory, who makes about 250 yuan
a month (or less than one U.S. cent per pair of jeans she stitches), says, "In
private companies, you know, the workers don't have rights."'
The government is ever-ready to crack down on independent unions not
attached to the All-China Federation of Trade Unions. The top leaders of the
newly formed League for the Protection of Workers' Rights were arrested after
they announced plans to form a nationwide movement. China, like Indonesia,
fears that independent unions will become the basis of Polish-style Solidarity
movements that can challenge the State. But what are the visions of these
62. See id. at 5.
63. Louis Won, Unionists Wary of Effort to Ban Work Sweatshops, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Jan.
24, 1994, at 7.
64. 137 hours per month works out to roughly fourteen hour workdays, over a five and one-half day
work week.
65. Ada Yuen, Foreign Firms in Work Abuse Claim, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Apr. 3, 1995, at 1.
66. Brauchli & Kahn, supra note 61, at 5.
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independent unions, in which human rights activists have invested so much
hope, for protecting women's rights?
In two petitions sent to the National People's Congress in early 1994,
independent labor movements frame their appeals in terms of social justice
whereby "state power must be subjected to the control of powerful citizens'
rights and activities."'67 The first document states:
Scattered individual rights behavior is inadequate for the effective
supervision of state power. Only collective citizen rights activities can
effectively resist the abuses of state power by certain officials.
Associations representing the interests of different social strata
established according to law constitute a prerequisite for exercising
legitimate collective citizen rights activities.6"
The reiteration of "collective citizen rights" disavows any notion of liberal
individualism, conceiving of human rights in terms of collective guarantees for
certified "social strata" such as peasants and workers (but not women?) in
society. The second statement, by the League for the Protection of the Rights
of the Working People, carefully distinguishes its vision of social rights from
that of the elites:
The political value orientation of the Chinese intellectual class is pro-
democracy, and the working class and peasantry are all the more pro-
social justice. The League will integrate these two tendencies and
make social justice and political democracy its goals. It will recruit
large numbers of members from among the workers, peasants, and
intellectuals, so as to enhance its strength and make preparations for
future social change.69
Again, the citizens' rights focus is on State protection of different sectors
of society as a whole, not individual rights. Although women's rights as a
category has existed throughout the history of Communist rule in China, in the
visions of the new labor movements in post-Maoist China, it does not appear
67. China: New Arrests Linked to Worker Rights, HUM. RTS. WATCH/ASIA (Vol. 6, No. 2) Mar. 11,
1994, at 7 (reproducing five proposals to the National People's Congress, released by Beijing dissidents).
68. Jd. at 7.
69. Id at 10.
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to be a significant issue that needs collective protection. This is a very
disturbing oversight under the conditions of market reform, euphemistically
referred to as "socialism with Chinese characteristics." To characterize this set
of labor demands as "political pluralism," as does Human Rights Watch/Asia,"
is to obscure the fact that independent labor unions are not demanding absolute
liberal rights, or attending to the rights of diverse groups including women and
minorities. The ultimate goal of the petition is to uphold "the centrality of
socialist market economic construction and reform and openness, actively
explore the social security system that would fully protect the working
people's rights and make them still more complete."'" Gender difference is
obliterated in this demand for collective social security and the responsibility
of the State to working people as a whole.
We should not be surprised, then, that for many working women in
China's coastal cities, exposure to values associated with rampant capitalism
and consumerism has made individualism very alluring. More compelling
than labor unions or workplace activism may be the bars and karaoke lounges
that have sprouted up in China's changing urbanscape. As I have discussed
elsewhere,72 young working women may spend their leisure hours in these
bars, seeking freedom from the oppressive conditions of capitalist workplaces
and from the State contamination or containment of labor politics. By taking
their lives into their own hands, and by seeking to disembed themselves from
the prior claims of a series of moral economies (family, community,
workplace, the nation), they hope to find a way to leave China, usually as a
mistress or wife of an overseas Chinese man. The dazzling world of
freewheeling overseas Chinese capitalism beckons, with its promise of
romance and individual freedom to choose one's interests and goals in life.
Ironically, by seeking release from their families and other social support
systems, they are all the more exposed to the fluid and flexible modes of
sexual exploitation represented by overseas tourists and businessmen. Such
experiences of individual freedom skate perilously close to Western notions
of liberal individualism, and may indeed account for the skepticism many in
Asia feel towards Western liberal values.
70. Seeid at 1.
71. Id at I1.
72. Aihwa Ong, Merchant Mandarins: The Family Romance of Overseas Chinese Capitalism, in
LOCATING CAPITALISM IN TIME AND SPACE: PAPERS ON THE INFLUENCE OF JOAN VINCENT (David Nugent
ed., forthcoming 1996).
1996]
GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES JOURNAL
It is clear that in both China and Indonesia, hopes vested in independent
labor movements as the sites for the articulation of women's rights, either in
collective or in individual terms, have yet to be realized. The visions instead
express notions of public morality that are framed by reciprocity, obligations,
and guarantees of basic survival between State and citizens. The imaginations
of these movements are not fired by workers' exploitation as women (or men)
so much as by the kind of abuses and injustices that threaten the overall
livelihood of the laboring poor.
The challenge to feminist theory, then, is to uncover the dynamics of a
"cultural citizenship"--processes whereby subjects are self-making and being-
made in webs of power relations that define how and where they belong in a
nation-state73--that is, embedded in moral economies of the State and culture.
Because gender hierarchy is at once the building block and basis of such public
moralities, attempts to intervene on behalf of women must be framed within
the normative constructs of the public moralities in these societies. It is
especially important, given the perilous links between the destructive aspects
of individualism and the notions of women's rights, that feminists disentangle
their concerns from the hegemonic discourse of the market and articulate their
cause in ways consonant with the moralistic terms of the society concerned.
VI. CONCLUSION: SISTERS IN THE INTREPRETATION OF PUBLIC
MORALITY
We have seen that in the imaginaries of independent labor movements in
Indonesia and China, workers' rights are framed not in some absolute abstract
notions of individual rights, but in terms of moral duties and obligations
between State and citizens. I suggest that for women's rights to gain an
audience in Asian societies, their concerns must also be articulated within a
moral discourse of communitarianism. By shifting their focus from the law
and rights to a focus on the cultural construction of public morality, Western
feminists can better appreciate the ways local feminists are negotiating for
gender reform in their countries. Indeed, for feminist interventions to be
effective, strategic sisterhood must mean not only feminist collaborations
formed to put pressure on governments to abide by international standards of
women's rights, but more basically, a sisterhood with men in interpreting and
73. See generally Aihwa Ong, Cultural Citizenship as Subject-Making: New Immigrants Negotiate
Ethnic and Racial Boundaries in the United States, 37 CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY 3705 (1996).
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formulating public morality in their own culture. Sisters in Islam, a feminist
group that is renegotiating gender relations in Malaysia, represents an
instructive example for Western feminist theory.
Malaysia is a rapidly industrializing country of less than 20 million people,
the majority of whom are Muslims, like their counterparts in Indonesia.
Export-oriented industries employ tens of thousands of young peasant women,
whose labor has made Malaysia the world's largest producer of disk drives and
microchips, and helped spawn a growing Malay middle class. While labor
conditions are rarely as bad as those in Indonesia, over the years, there have
been protests-over low wages, work conditions, and labor controls--in the
form of strikes, slow-downs, and individual modes of resistance, such as
attacks on machines and spirit possession incidents that disrupt production.74
My research among Malay female workers convinces me that we must
understand how gender inequality becomes interwoven with class exploitation,
and that local cultural norms, foreign cultural practices, and capitalist
instrumentality all play a role in constructing gender hierarchies in these free
trade zones. In a review of the literature on female industrial workers created
by globalization, I suggest that in order to pierce elite and male silences over
female exploitation, we must analyze the ways women and men struggle over
cultural meanings that structure their lives.7" This observation has been borne
out by the Sisters in Islam, a group of Western-educated feminists who seek
to change gender relations, not by employing Western feminist theory, but by
developing a voice in reinterpreting the key texts in Islam. They combine the
liberal tradition of creative questioning and revisioning with the Islamic
tradition of authoritative interpretation of the Qur'an, the hadith, and the
sunna. This strategy has been crucial in the current rise of women's rights
movements in the Islamic world. Boutheina Cheriet, of the University of
Algiers, remarks that, "At Beijing, for the first time, the right to religious
higher education became a demand. That would then give us credibility in
interpreting the texts."76 Although the movements for Muslim women's rights
elsewhere face uncertain futures,' Sisters in Islam appears to have carved an
effective role for themselves in redefining the Islamic community (umma) in
Malaysia.
74. See generally ONG, supra note 45.
75. Id
76. Barbara Crossette, Women's Rights Gaining Attention Within Islam, N.Y. TIMES, May 12, 1996,
at A3.
77. Id
19961
GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES JOURNAL
One of the outcomes of mass employment in Malaysia has been attempts
by Islamic revivalists to enforce social controls on women's activities and
rights.7s Some religious leaders assert that Islamic law, the shari'a, governing
everyday behavior is immutable and cannot be modified even in contexts of
rapid social change. In the name of Islam, many clerics would like to enforce
all kinds of stringent rules governing bodily comportment and marriage at the
very point when women have become a dominant part of modem public life.
In response to this challenge, the Sisters articulate women's issues within
the context of the umma. In their brochures, they express their desire to
provide a "[p]ublic forum on the modem nation, state, and Islam: no. 1, with
special focus on minorities and women (as a Muslim minority)."79 They do
this by engaging clerics in a dialogue on the question of women in Islamic
texts. One of the founding Sisters, Noraini Othman, protests that as
industrialization gains momentum, an Arabocentric, narrow, and anachronistic
reading of Islamic laws has informed the Islamization policies proposed by the
revivalists, thus resulting in a tightening of controls on the participation of
Muslims in all spheres of life: "Both the eternal text of the Qur'an and the
historical, contingent texts of the sunna and shari'a are read and humanly
understood by living people--ulama and other believers--of their own
particular time and place.""s
By insisting on the historicity of interpretations, the Sisters have created
a discursive space for a narrative of gender inequality and the possibility for
Muslim women to renegotiate gender roles and rights. They claim that,
contrary to the clerics' contention, the Qur 'an "enjoins justice between women
and men."81 Much of this debate is carried out in the leading newspapers in
Malaysia, thus creating a forum in which ordinary citizens can participate
through reading and writing to the editors.
Using the print media, the Sisters systematically attack the chauvinist
notions that inform the clerics' interpretations of Islam. One of the more
glaring holds that because men are "adulterous by nature," Islam sought to
accomodate their sexual drive by sanctioning polygamy. The Sisters argue
78. See generally Aihwa Ong, State versus Islam: Malay Families, Women's Bodies, and the Body
Politic in Malaysia, in BEWITCHING WOMEN, PIOUS MEN: GENDER AND BODY POLITICS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
(Aihwa Ong & Michael G. Peletz eds., 1995)(providing a gendered analysis of the recent Islamic revivalist
movement in Malaysia).
79. SISTERS IN ISLAM, Muslim Women Speak (Malaysia forum pamphlet, 1993).
80. Norani Othman, The Socio-Political Dimensions of Islamisation in Malaysia: A Cultural
Accommodation of Social Change? (1995) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the author).
81, Nik Aziz's, Putting Down Women Wrong, NEW STRArrS TIMES, Dec. 1, 1991.
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that the Qur'an does not give men the blanket right to have more than one
wife.8" They reinterpret polygamy not as a right, but as a responsibility to
ensure that socio-justice be achieved for orphans. They point to the socio-
historical context--the aftermath of the battle of Uhud, which left many women
and children without support--within which the particular verse on polygamy
was revealed in the Qur'an. Allah indicated polygamy as the solution to this
particular problem of war orphans and widows. Indeed, the Sisters reminded,
the Qur'an placed a number of conditions on this practice, emphasizing justice
and fairness to children and wives. They also dismissed the notion that a wife
who allows her husband to take a second wife will go to heaven. They
conclude firmly, that there is no basis in the Qur'an "to say that polygamy is
Islam's solution for men's alledged[ly] [sic] unbridled lust."83
Another bone of contention deals with Arabic dress codes that have been
introduced by revivalists as the proper garb of devout Muslims, and also
ostensibly to protect women (and men) from the evil temptations of modem
society. The Sisters, citing relevant verses, argue that "[c]oercion is contrary
to the spirit of the Qur'an which states that there is no compulsion in [Islamic]
religion."'  They criticize the dress codes as revealing an obsession "to
enforce faith through authoritarian means." 5 The way to protect women,
according to Islam, is by decent and respectful treatment of women. The
Sisters then expose the social dynamics of male domination in Muslim society:
"Men have dominated women politically in many Muslim societies and this
control has been falsely equated with legitimate authority. Institutions were
established to support and reinforce men's prejudices, enabling them to evade
their responsibility towards Allah and other human beings."86
The Sisters note that by reading the appropriate Qur'anic verses, women
would be able to make their own choices based on their faith in Allah. The
kind of coercive dress policy "in fact, runs counter to Islam's emancipatory
emphasis upon reason [and] freedom as the basis of human morality."87
Thus, the Sisters' dialogic engagement with the Islamic clerics not only
produces a more liberal interpretation of Muslim ideas governing women, it
also promotes Muslim women's agency in dealing directly with their own
82. Lifting the Veil of Inequality, ASIAWEEK, Aug. 9, 1991, at 27.
83. Id
84. Sisters in Islam, Of Dress and Muslim Women, NEW STRArrS TIMES, Nov. 14, 1991.
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religion. Sisters in Islam represents a kind of feminist communitarianism that
combines the liberal right to question, revise, and transform the givens that are
represented by some cultural or religious hegemony; yet they do so within the
cultural norms or projects of their own community. This is the kind of
feminism that, without once invoking liberal democratic ideals, has made men
in their own society acknowledge women's exploitation, and at the same time
puts a limit on communitarian forces that enforce greater controls over women.
A Malaysian official who is now the chairman of the UN Commission for
Human Rights notes:
Malaysia used to be a male-dominated society .... In the old days,
there was no talk of women's rights, but through the gradual process
of politicization, women ... are able to assert themselves. Compared
with ten years ago, there is much more publicity, consciousness, and
more sensitivity on questions of women's rights.8
Malaysia is still a male-dominated society, but much of the credit for the
development of general awareness of gender inequalities must be attributed to
the Sisters in Islam, who promoted women's rights without condemning their
own culture or religion. They can productively negotiate with discourses of
community, forcing into the open the issue of gender inequality that
communitarian narratives suppress. As for cross-cultural strategic sisterhood,
the Sisters are linked to feminists in North African and South Asian countries,
often meeting to exchange notes and to share strategies of struggle for
women's cultural citizenship within Islamic modernity.
The work of these courageous and astute women deserves respect from
Western feminists and their theories, and should not be dismissed or
marginalized for accomodating Islam and not subscribing to liberal notions of
sexual equality. After all, feminism and women's rights only make sense in
terms of the imagined communities within which people live and, through their
embeddedness in cultural relations and norms, decide what is good and
worthwhile in their lives.
Globalization produces not a single international sisterhood but many
possible, negotiable, and partial collaborations between feminists in different
countries. To be truly strategic, Western feminists must recognize and deal
creatively with the complex imbrications of global and local regimes of power
88. Musa Hitam, The Rights Debate, AsIAWEEK, Dec. 1, 1995, at 55,56.
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linked to nationalism, capital, and cultural hegemonies. Feminist sisterhoods
are strategic when they can create a transnational public--beyond the nation-
state--that does not exclude the variety of alternative visions of female
citizenship framed within alternative political moralities. Strategic sisterhood,
in my view, will be most effective when it adheres to such a "weak"--or
flexible--universal of female emancipation.

